Hungary chose Europe

Let’s imagine a theatre play: it is 1989, the fall of the Soviet bloc. A 26-year-old Hungarian politician says a speech, which becomes iconic with the emblematic words – quoted from the Hungarian revolution of 1956 –: ‘Russians, go home!’. 10 years later, in 1998, this politician is still young and gets elected as the prime minister of Hungary for one session. He loses the elections in 2002 but returns in 2010 and doesn’t step down for the next 16 years. He makes a ‘Russian puppet’ out of Hungary. Until in 2024 there comes a 45-year-old guy, stepping out of the government circles, who is critical now. The guy used to have the young dictator’s poster on his teenage bedroom wall, but now he promises to restore democracy in Hungary. His second name means ‘Hungarian’ in Hungarian which is quite symbolic, because he kind of ‘steals back’ the Hungarian national symbols that the other guy appropriated in the previous 16 years. Magyar defeats the now 63-year-old dictator, Viktor Orbán – because it is him, of course – with his very own words (also the slogan of the 56 revolution): ‘Russians, go home!’

This story sounds like a theatre play, but it was written by life. The collapse of the ‘global illiberal laboratory’, the Hungarian Orbán-regime is a generational experience I will never forget. It is a mixture of strong emotions: disbelief; joy; hope that it might become better even so we cannot be sure yet; and grief for those – people, institutions – that did not survive this finale. People, who emigrated, left their profession, or even died – lacking proper health care; theatres, companies… As Stefano Bottoni wrote to the New York Times, ‘It’s tempting to see Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s rule over Hungary as an aberration, a 16-year exercise in subordinating liberal democracy to one man’s will. But that overlooks how Mr. Orban’s regime revived a political tradition that has long characterized Hungarian politics. […] In this view, Mr. Orban represents not rupture but continuity.’ It is quite true: many harmful reflexes have penetrated our cultures over our history. Self-censorship, and, in sectors that have been starved of resources, a ruthless and often anti-collegial struggle over what little remains, among others. Now we must become democratic citizens which won’t be easy without such traditions. But in 2026 Hungary voted for democracy on 12 April with bigger legitimization than any Hungarian politician got since 1989. This victory is probably the result of having become one of the poorest and most corrupt country in the EU. Now there’s a global example that a peaceful democratic transition may be possible. But Hungary still has a long way to go.

The illiberal villain, Victor Orbán has not won now, but he is not done yet. Can his defeat become a model for conquering illiberalism globally? Not likely. Are there elements, that may be useful for other countries that left the democratic path? Probably. Part of the lesson is, that Hungary’s prime minister elect’s, Péter Magyar’s victory is owed in large part to the free media, whose persistent, often thankless work relying on advertising, reader subscriptions, and often donations, effectively fulfilled a public service role in place of state media which got tons of state support. And it was able to reach younger audiences, whose generation decided this regime shift ultimately. (There is some hope that they will not follow the waves of emigration that have characterized recent years). The other thing is, that Magyar is a disillusioned former Fidesz official. He is a liberal conservative, while his party „Tisza” can be called a centrist conservative / folk party (with certain leftist/social democrat elements) which integratory nature was essential for the change. Tisza-supporters represent contrasting political views but share the idea that they want to belong to the European Union and the West, to live in democracy. So, one possible message to countries with an illiberal / populist leadership may be, that compromise is essential between different political groups/worldviews. It is a thrilling aesthetic question how much for instance the hermeneutics of Hungarian national symbols has changed over these 16 years. Social democrat and leftist Fidesz-opponents used to look down upon the so called „nationalistic” symbols such as braided Hungarian jacket and Hungarian tricolour cockade. Fidesz was very efficient with the appropriation of national symbols. ‘The homeland cannot be in opposition.’ – Orbán said, which meant, that Fidesz’s opposition could not belong to the nation. If we saw Péter Magyar’s figure in Hungarian folk embroidery 16 years ago, his outfit used to express nationalism. Now, it expresses unity and respect for our differences.

When it comes to cultural policy, it may be too early to guess, as when I write these lines, we don’t even yet know the entire new government, including who the new minister for culture will be. But I think the most prompting issues when planning a cultural policy is a regime change in culture at last, which did not happen in 1989 or in 2010. So far, we know very little about any particularities from the cultural program of the winner Tisza Party, which, wisely and tactically, outlines only the main directions, such as the separation of politics and culture. Outside Hungary it may be difficult to understand why a political program is lacking facts (Fidesz does not have a program since 2010, and Orbán does not participate in pre-election debate since 2006). But this was a very dirty election campaign, and endless (state) money was spent on propaganda destroying Orbán’s possible successor. So, it was a tactical approach indeed, not to tell too much too early, as it was of primary importance to win with two third majority and restore democracy. This concentration of power may become dangerous on the long run if it stays like this. For now, however, what was needed is a mandate strong victory—potentially even for constitution-making—to restore democracy.

We know that a former actor of one of Budapest’s most prestigious public theatres, the Katona József Theatre, Ervin Nagy is aspiring to the role of the Minister of Culture. As he comes from the field of theatre, we can expect cultural changes there maybe sooner in the theatrical field. The cultural program states: ‘Theatres will be funded based on audience numbers and cultural value.’ It suggests that this approach partly assumes a business/market-oriented model, and that one of the explicitly stated goals is the restoration of decision-making committees, alongside the withdrawal of high-level politics from the direct allocation of funding. Another aim is the reconciliation of a deeply divided country and cultural sphere. What remains unclear, however, is which ’values’ would define the framework of cultural policy. Much will depend on how much the new leadership entrusts to trade unions—with which Fidesz never engaged. One can only hope that the new government will begin by opening a dialogue with them.

However, there is a great deal to be done in every sector, and almost all of them may seem more urgent than culture. Many have pointed out that the task is to create a political system that does not allow for an anti-democratic turn (or at least makes it extremely difficult) checks and balances and participation of the civic society. But first and foremost, Hungary expects accountability and consequences in high politics for the immense crimes, corruption, and betrayals. That the many injustices over the past sixteen years should finally have consequences, something that was largely missed after the transition of 1989. At the same time, there is also a growing recognition that the slogan ‘the homeland cannot be in opposition’ can no longer serve as a guiding principle. There should be reconciliation, but this time it should go hand in hand with confronting/remembering the past. Former top perpetrators should not decide over public issues and money again. Fake news, distorted reality/narratives of past must not be whitewashed or considered to be normal.

The Orbán-regime put government-loyal people into every position, and the pyramid of theatre was united by the once talented theatre director, later tyrannis, Attila Vidnyánszky. Vidnyánszky was much more than an artist, he held numerous – about 16 – key positions in theatre culture. He is responsible – among other things – for the complete financial exploitation of the independent Hungarian performing arts or the violation of autonomy and the hijacking of the University of Theatre and Film Arts, Budapest. His appointment as the the artistic director (and in his case, a CEO) of the National Theatre in Budapest started in 2013 and runs until 2028. But hopefully it can continue without his former blatant privileges for his National Theatre-model with folk museum-like elements. Also, investigations must begin in the meantime—for example, to establish responsibility for the 2023 accident at the National Theatre, in which two actors performed on a set without safety barriers after working overtime and suffered serious injuries, one of them permanent. Or to withdraw funding from a nationwide theatre initiative established in 2020 (Déryné Program), now operating on a budget of over 21.130.000 EUR and characterized by a highly uneven artistic standard. Experimenal performing arts need to get some fresh air. It’ll also need to be answered, what will happen to the University of Theatre and Film Arts in Budapest, which Vidnyánszky hijacked. Can the politically motivated dismissals and other losses be undone—the derailing of so many young lives? What will happen to those who were forced to abandon their careers? To the independent performing art groups that dissolved. It must be stated that much of this is hardly reparable. The restoration of professional standards, however—yes, that is possible. And primarily – we must come to terms finally with our (most recent and longer) past.

On a more personal note, I should add that after 10 years in June 2025 my colleagues and I collectively resigned on the editorial board of SZÍNHÁZ, Hungary’s leading theatre journal. This was our response to the conditions imposed on arts journals—and on the theatre sector more broadly—under the Orbán regime, as we were no longer willing to continue work under such circumstances. I would like to believe this was not an act of escape, but one of self-care and respect for our own limits. At the same time, rather than freezing SZÍNHÁZ, we entrusted it to a younger, emerging group, supporting their work from the journal’s curatorial board. Their task will not be easy, as it is highly unlikely that cultural institutions—including journals—will be an immediate priority in the new era. As I suggested earlier, it is also unlikely that it is the previous system that will be restored. When it comes to experimental, non-market-oriented fields, there will likely be an even greater need than before for sources such as EU funding for instance. It will not be easy, but it is a remarkable feeling that from now on, we have a second chance for democracy, and much will depend on us. As a Hungarian poet and playwright wrote on social media ironically on the night of the elections: ‘Damn, now I’ll actually have to solve all the problems I used to blame on Orbán.’”